Juiltrial  ^rttlment 


of  iinternational  StapidES 


No.  0 

©Ijf  Work  of  tk?  i^aguo  (Court 

By  N.  3fnlitt0 

Professor  of  Law,  University  of  Paris 


NOVEMBER,  1911  o 


> 

Published  Quarterly  by  American  Society  for  Judicial  Settlement 
of  International  Disputes. 


iPaltimare,  M.  g>.  A. 


Eutered  as  seco: 
the  Postofflce  at 
Julj  16,  1S94. 


rch  21,  1910,  at 
tder  the  Act  of 


Work  of  tijr  Olourt 

By  N. 

Professor  of  Law,  University  of  Paris 
(Translated) 

I 

Three  years  ago  M,  Leon  Bourgeois  closed 
a most  eloquent  discourse  by  saying  that  the 
delegates  of  the  Nations  at  the  Second  Hague 
Peace  Conference  had,  in  the  course  of  its 
memorable  sittings,  “heard  the  first  heart- 
beats of  humanity,  very  faint  as  yet,  but 
already  quite  regular  and  distinct.” 

That  was  an  admirable  metaphor  with  which 
to  indicate  that — compared  with  society  as 
organized  within  the  state — the  society  of 
nations  is  still,  so  to  speak,  in  embryo.  Its 
organization,  scarcely  outlined  as  yet,  is  devel- 
oping bit  by  bit  under  our  eyes.  It  already 
has  certain  laws ; but  these  laws  are  most 


3 


incomplete,  and  the  governments  are  seeking, 
with  increasing  regularity  and  growing  activ- 
ity, to  fill  numerous  gaps.  It  likewise  has  a 
system  of  justice;  but  if  it  is  no  longer  quite 
private  justice  neither  is  it  as  yet  true  public 
justice.  It  is  an  intermediary  system,  a sort 
of  make-believe  which  all  human  societies  have 
practised  before  possessing  permanent  tri- 
bunals; its  name  is  arbitral  justice. 

This  system  of  justice  is  of  ancient  origin. 
In  1899  the  Nations  sought  to  improve  it  by 
creating  at  The  Hague  an  institution  termed 
the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration.  This  was 
the  great  innovation  made  by  the  First  Peace 
Conference.  But  we  must  not  be  deceived  by 
terms.  Like  the  old  Holy  Roman  Empire,  the 
Hague  Court  by  no  means  merits  its  title ; it 
has  no  permanence  and  does  not  present  any 
cf  the  essential  characteristics  of  a true  court 
of  justice. 

That  which  one  really  finds  at  The  Hague  is 
simply  a place  where  justice  may  be  dispensed 
when  the  Nations  are  minded  to  send  any 
judges  there.  Its  locus  is  a modest  house  at 
the  edge  of  a quiet  canal,  with  an  audience 


4 


room  so  small  that  when  counsel  are  numerous 
the  arbitrators  are  compelled  to  seek  the  hos- 
pitality of  the  government  of  the  Netherlands. 
Thanks  to  the  generosity  of  Mr.  Carnegie  the 
Court  of  Arbitration  will  soon  have  an  ade- 
quate locus  in  the  form  of  a superb  marble 
palace. 

Although  we  do  not  find  judges  resident  at 
The  Hague,  we  find  there  the  means  for  pro- 
curing them.  There  exists  at  the  locus  of  the 
Court  a long  list  on  which  the  Nations  have 
each  placed  at  most  the  names  of  four  men 
designated  by  them  members  of  the  Court. 
These  men  are  chosen  from  among  the  most 
honorable  and  distinguished  persons  who  are 
disposed  to  accept  the  duties  of  an  arbitrator 
when  a case  for  arbitration  arises.  The  list  is 
designed  to  facilitate  the  selection  of  arbitra- 
tors by  the  governments  concerned,  although 
their  choice  is  not  limited  to  it. 

At  first  public  opinion  was  very  skeptical  as 
to  the  future  of  this  institution,  so  timid  and 
poor  did  it  appear.  The  authors  of  it  alone 
manifested  any  confidence  in  it.  They  felt 
certain  that,  once  installed,  the  Court  would 
soon  be  burdened  with  cases. 


S 


Nevertheless  after  the  Court  was  inaugu- 
rated it  waited  three  years  in  vain  for  a case. 

Its  first  case  came  to  it  from  the  New  World. 
The  United  States  and  Mexico  brought  before 
it  a money  dispute  of  long  standing.  And  its 
first  decision  was  finally  rendered  October  14, 
1902. 

A beginning  had  been  made.  The  example 
was  soon  followed.  Close  upon  each  other’s 
heels,  from  1902  to  1904,  in  connection  with 
four  cases  of  different  nature,  twelve  Nations 
came  to  The  Hague  to  choose  their  judges. 

But  this  ardor  did  not  last.  In  1905  the 
Court  rose  not  to  sit  again  for  four  long  years. 
Then  in  1909  it  renewed  its  activity  and  in 
twenty  months  it  succeeded  in  doubling  the 
number  of  decisions  rendered.  Seven  States, 
all  former  pleaders  in  the  first  period  of  its 
activity — “old  offenders” — came  to  ask  the 
Court  to  solve  for  them  five  different  questions. 

II 

Thus  the  Hague  Court  has  to  its  credit 
achievements  sufficiently  important.  In  the 
course  of  ten  years  it  has  been  active  enough 


6 


for  us  to  note  its  advantages  and  its  defects. 
But  the  problem  is  not  simple,  and  we  run  the 
risk  of  pronouncing  a hasty  judgment  unless 
we  are  careful  to  examine  all  sides  of  it. 
Remarking  only  the  number  of  cases  brought 
before  the  Court,  the  nature  of  them,  and  the 
value  of  the  decisions,  we  are  tempted  to 
declare  that  the  services  rendered  by  the 
Hague  Court  are  rather  mediocre.  One  notes 
that  the  great  majority  of  arbitrations  do  not, 
as  yet,  really  come  to  The  Hague.  During 
these  ten  years  of  its  existence  and  despite  its 
exceptional  activity  in  the  last  few  months,  the 
Court  has  attracted  to  itself  hardly  one-sixth 
of  the  arbitrations  which  have  taken  place. 

We  must  of  course  remember  the  difficulties 
inherent  in  starting  every  new  institution. 
We  cannot  change,  in  a day,  habits  practised 
for  generations.  As  the  Hague  Court  becomes 
better  known  and  as  its  work  inspires  more 
confidence,  it  will  be  more  resorted  to.  There 
is  already  discoverable  a movement  which 
augurs  well  for  the  future : the  activities  of  the 
Court,  renewed  in  igog  and  pursued  through 
igio  and  igii,  are  about  to  be  continued  by 
the  cases  which  Russia  and  Turkey,  Italy  and 


7 


Peru  have  already  resolved  to  submit  to  it, 
and  by  other  arbitrations  which  are  actually 
projected. 

But  even  from  the  standpoint  of  their  im- 
portance, the  cases  brought  before  the  Hague 
Court  do  merit  attention.  True,  the  reference 
of  some  of  them  to  arbitration  was  not  based 
upon  a crying  necessity.  The  question  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Mexico  of  the 
Pious  Funds  of  the  Californias  was  taken  out 
of  its  pigeon-hole  simply  to  enable  the  Hague 
Court  to  start.  Similarly  the  Boutres  of 
Muscat  became  a subject  of  arbitration  owing 
merely  to  the  desire  of  the  States  concerned  to 
give  practical  application  to  their  treaty  of 
arbitration  of  1903.  Finally  the  recent  Savarkar 
affair  was  submitted  to  the  Hague  Court  for 
the  purpose  less  of  terminating  a deadlock 
between  two  governments  than  of  satisfying 
the  susceptibilities  of  certain  journals. 

In  other  cases  which  have  come  before  it 
the  Hague  Court  has,  however,  rendered  real 
service.  By  means  of  the  Court  it  was  possible 
to  arrive  at  a peaceful  and  honorable  settle- 
ment of  controversies,  the  solution  of  which 


8 


could  not  have  been  attained  by  direct  nego- 
tiation. 

True,  the  solution  offered  by  the  Court  has 
not  always  been  what  it  should  have  been.  In 
order  to  estimate  properly  the  value  of  its 
awards  we  must  keep  in  mind  the  two  principal 
functions  of  arbitration.  Arbitration  is,  or 
rather  aims  to  be,  a judicial  process  by  which 
States  may  have  the  law  defined  in  disputes  of 
a justiciable  nature,  though  it  still  preserves 
its  historic  office  as  a diplomatic  process,  per- 
mitting States,  in  the  event  of  political  conflicts 
where  their  dignity  appears  to  prevent  volun- 
tary compromise,  to  accept  a compromise 
which  an  arbitrator  imposes  upon  them  in  the 
name  of  the  superior  principle  of  justice.  In 
such  a case,  it  is  true,  the  cause  of  peace  gains 
more  than  the  cause  of  law;  but  law  would 
lose  still  more  if  peace  were  not  preserved. 
And  then,  homage  to  justice  is  never  sterile. 
While  awaiting  the  coming  of  its  proper  sway, 
justice  is  offering  an  ever  broader  shelter  to 
diplomatic  concessions. 

According  as  arbitration  fulfills  one  or  the 
other  of  its  functions,  the  role  of  the  arbitrator 
differs  and  the  significance  of  the  award  varies. 


9 


The  %*alue  of  arbitration  as  an  instrument  of 
law  depends  above  all  on  the  award  because  it 
determines  legality.  The  arbitrator  ought  to 
be  made  to  feel  that  peace  does  not  depend 
upon  his  decision.  He  may,  and  legally  he 
should,  say  without  ulterior  motive  “let  justice 
be  done he  should  fix  his  attention  less  on 
the  adjustment  of  difficulties  than  on  the  prac- 
tical application  of  the  law. 

As  an  instrument  of  peace,  on  the  other 
hand,  arbitration  has  value  by  virtue  of  its  very 
spirit,  i.  e.  because  of  the  pacific  intention  of 
the  States  that  employ  it.  In  serious  contro- 
versies, involving  national  pride,  arbitration 
has  a calming  effect.  That  effect  results  from 
compromise.  The  moment  an  agreement  to 
resort  to  arbitration  is  reached,  discussions 
become  useless  and  recriminations  lose  their 
object.  Moreover,  the  award  is  then  only  of 
secondary  interest.  So  much  so  that  what  one 
expects  from  it  is  simply  to  confirm  the  desire 
for  peace  which  is  already  manifested  by  the 
“compromis”  or  conditions  of  the  arbitration. 
The  arbitrator  should  concern  himself  with 
justifying  the  confidence  reposed  in  him  by 
the  parties  to  the  controversy,  with  rounding 


10 


the  angles  and  with  couching  his  award  in 
prudent  language  which  will  not  offend  the 
susceptibilities  of  either  party. 

Each  of  these  offices  of  arbitration  has  its 
own  domain,  that  of  justice  being  limited  to 
controversies  of  a juridical  character,  that  of 
peace  to  controversies  of  a political  character. 
This  distinction  is  important  because,  if  it 
leaves  its  proper  domain,  each  runs  the  risk  of 
failing  in  the  effect  which  one  has  a right  to 
expect  of  it.  To  employ  pacific  arbitration  in 
legal  controversies  is  to  interpret  falsely  the 
conception  of  justice.  To  resort  to  judicial 
arbitration  in  political  controversies  is  to  en- 
danger the  maintenance  of  peace. 

This  distinction  recommends  itself  to  our 
judgment  because  of  still  another  considera- 
tion: namely,  the  more  the  distinction  is  ob- 
served the  better  will  we  succeed  in  encour- 
aging resort  to  arbitration  in  political  conflicts. 
It  is  commonly  remarked  that  arbitration  is 
not  susceptible  of  indefinite  extension,  that  it 
has  its  necessary  limitations,  that  political 
questions  are  outside  of  its  domain  because 
arbitration,  being  by  definition  the  adjustment 
of  controversies  “on  the  basis  of  respect  for 


law”  (Convention  of  1907  for  the  Pacific  Regu- 
lation of  International  Controversies,  art.  37), 
it  cannot  be  applied  to  disputes  for  the  solution 
of  which  law  fails  to  supply  any  rules,  and  that 
the  progress  of  arbitration  must  therefore  be 
subordinated  to  that  of  law.  This  thesis  is 
perhaps  contestable  in  theory  because  there 
are  practically  no  political  questions  which 
may  not  be  translated  into  questions  of  law. 
It  is  none  the  less  true  that  as  a doctrine  it 
carries  weight  and  in  actual  practice  influences 
the  nature  of  treaties  in  which  we  find  obliga- 
tory arbitration  ordinarily  confined  to  very 
narrow  limits.  If  this  be  so,  it  is  because  in 
speaking  of  arbitration  one  thinks  above  all 
about  its  judicial  function.  But  if  we  examine 
its  pacific  function  in  which  the  rigidity  of  law 
is  less  governing  and  the  role  of  arbitrator  be- 
comes more  flexible,  the  aspect  of  the  question 
is  changed  and  arbitration  appears  susceptible 
of  an  indefinite  extension.  Therefore  to  dis- 
tinguish between  its  two  functions  tends  to 
promote  its  growth.  The  conclusion  of  treaties 
of  obligatory  arbitration  without  reservations 
is  rendered  easier  because  the  difficulties  which 
may  arise  in  carrying  out  such  agreements  are 


13 


caused  to  disappear  in  advance.  Of  course 
there  remains  the  necessity  of  separating  po- 
litical questions  from  juridical  questions,  and 
this  is  not  an  easy  task.  Men  have  occasion- 
ally asserted  that  it  was  an  impossible  task, 
and  consequently  that  obligatory  arbitration, 
if  limited  to  juridical  questions,  was  impracti- 
cal, because,  in  default  of  the  ability  to  define 
what  constitutes  a juridical  question,  it  is  al- 
ways possible  to  escape  the  obligation  to  resort 
to  arbitration  by  setting  up  as  an  excuse  the 
political  character  of  the  controversy.  This 
objection  falls  if  it  be  understood  that  the 
nature  of  the  controversy  shall  affect  only  the 
form  of  the  arbitration  without  at  any  time 
wholly  excluding  the  arbitration.  As  to  the 
problem  of  determining  the  nature  of  the  con- 
troversy, it  would  seem  that  it  is  a question  of 
attitude  of  mind  rather  than  a question  of 
kind.  In  short,  that  which  signifies  is  less  the 
intrinsic  character  of  the  dispute  than  the  com- 
plexion the  dispute  takes  on  by  reason  of  the 
States  which  are  parties  to  it,  and  of  the  whole 
circumstances  which  have  brought  it  up.  A 
controversy  plainly  juridical  may  degenerate 
into  a political  controversy  the  moment  na- 


tional  honor  becomes  involved.  The  deser- 
tions at  Casablanca  constitute  a striking  case 
in  point.  Reciprocally,  a question  of  influence 
and  domination  may  be  made  to  turn  upon  a 
question  of  law  which  will  be  found  included 
in  it  if  peaceful  intentions  on  the  part  of  the 
States  concerned  incline  them  to  deprive  the 
dispute  of  its  political  character.  This  is  what 
happened  in  the  Boutres  of  Muscat  case. 

Ill 

But  in  order  that  arbitration  be  effectively 
employed,  according  to  circumstances,  in  its 
several  ways,  it  is  not  sufficient  simply  to  dis- 
tinguish the  offices  it  performs,  nor  to  define 
merely  its  domain  and  its  logical  effects.  We 
must  go  further  and  separate  them  in  a some- 
what material  fashion,  giving  to  each  its  dis- 
tinct organ.  Just  here  appears  the  insufficiency 
of  the  Hague  Court. 

In  its  practical  operation  the  Hague  Court 
has  discovered  itself  to  be  rather  an  adjunct  to 
the  chancelleries  than  a true  international  tri- 
bunal. It  has  been  more  inclined  to  the  pacific 
function  than  to  the  judicial  function.  Natur- 
ally this  is  the  case  in  connection  with  matters, 


14 


the  political  side  of  which  is  the  dominant  side, 
as  in  the  Casablanca  arbitration  already  re- 
ferred to  where  the  award  was  a masterpiece 
of  juridical  adaptation  and  diplomatic  concilia- 
tion. But  the  Court  has  occasionally  acted  in 
the  same  manner  in  cases  where  peace  was  not 
threatened  and  where  accordingly  the  ques- 
tions of  law  submitted  to  the  Court  should 
have  been  approached  by  it  with  all  the  rigor 
of  juridical  reasoning.  On  this  score  many  of 
its  decisions  deserve  only  qualified  approval, 
or  are  even  open  to  criticism.  This  is  true  of 
the  award  giving  preference  to  certain  credit- 
ors of  Venezuela  (February  22,  1904),  of  the 
Boutres  of  Muscat  case  (August  8,  1905),  of 
the  Atlantic  Fisheries  case,  the  more  especially 
in  connection  with  the  definition  of  bays  (Sep- 
tember 5,  1910),  and  of  the  Savarkar  affair 
(February  24,  1911). 

Such  result  is  due  primarily  to  the  way  in 
which  the  Court  is  organized.  The  arbitrators 
called  to  sit  in  each  case  are  the  objects  of  a 
choice  which  binds  them  to  the  contestants 
from  whom  they  receive  their  mandate.  Inas- 
much as  they  may  be  diplomats  and  are  some- 
times nationals  of  the  countries  parties  to  the 
dispute,  they  do  not  bring  to  the  deliberations 


15 


o£  the  Court— -and  have  never  been  suspected 
of  so  doing— -the  spirit  of  impartiality  and  the 
disposition  of  the  true  judge.  Being  tempor- 
ary, without  connection  v/ith  those  which  have 
preceded  and  which  are  to  follow  them,  the  tri- 
bunals called  into  brief  existence  at  The  Hague 
cannot  contribute  to  the  upbuilding  of  a sys- 
tematic jurisprudence. 

To  remedy  this  defect,  it  becomes  necessary 
to  proceed  to  establish  the  truly  permanent 
Court  recommended  by  the  United  States. 
Thanks  to  the  foresight  and  praiseworthy  ac- 
tivity of  American  diplomacy  we  are  actually 
in  a fair  way  to  realize  this  project.  And  this 
development  is  in  the  natural  order  of  things: 
in  all  human  society  the  establishment  of  a 
permanent  tribunal  of  public  justice  has  re- 
sulted from  the  growth  of  arbitral  justice.  It 
responds  today  to  a real  need.  The  existing 
Court  is  specializing  more  and  more  in  the 
pacific  offices  of  arbitration,  of  which  it  tends 
to  become  the  true  organ  in  political  conflicts. 
The  judicial  side  of  arbitration,  on  the  other 
hand,  awaits  its  instrument  in  the  field  of 
juridical  controversies.  When  the  time  is  ripe 
there  will  appear  a truly  permanent  Court  to 
fill  this  void. 


We  may  feel  certain  that  its  creation  will 
produce  considerable  changes  in  international 
relations,  both  juridical  and  political.  Among 
these  probable  changes  there  is  one  which  de- 
serves to  be  pointed  out  now  for  the  reason 
that  it  will  fit  in  with  a tendency  which  in  our 
day  is  manifesting  itself  with  growing  inten- 
sity. In  various  ways  one  has  been  impressed 
lately  with  the  necessity  of  promoting  arbitra- 
tion in  disputes  between  States  and  individuals, 
in  freeing  it  from  preliminary  diplomatic  for- 
malities which  at  present  impede  resort  to  it. 
We  must  do  for  arbitral  justice  that  which  has 
already  been  done  for  the  law  of  prize:  give  to 
individuals  direct  recourse  to  an  international 
tribunal,  just  as  the  Convention  of  1907  (art. 
4,  sec.  2 and  3)  provides  shall  be  done  in  con- 
nection with  the  International  Court  of  Prize. 
This  step  is  not  possible  in  connection  with 
the  Hague  Court  as  at  present  organized, 
its  diplomatic  character  offering  a manifest 
obstacle.  It  will,  on  the  contrary,  be  fully 
realizable  in  connection  with  a court  truly  per- 
manent which,  by  its  organization  and  by  its 
judicial  spirit,  may  be  expected  to  meet  all  the 
requirements  of  intemationad  justice. 


Amrrtrmt  ^ori^tu  for  Suitrial  ^rttlrmrnl 
of  Sntrrnational  Stsputrs 

The  printed  proceedings  of  the  Conference 
of  the  American  Society  for  Judicial  Settle- 
ment of  International  Disputes,  Washington, 
December  15-17,  1910,  which  furnished  the 
occasion  for  the  memorable  utterance  of  Presi- 
dent William  Howard  Taft  on  the  subject  of 
an  all-inclusive  treaty  of  arbitration,  are  now 
ready. 

The  collection  of  addresses  will  be  found  of 
great  importance.  They  throw  light  on 
present  day  problems  of  an  international  char- 
acter, containing  most  interesting  historical 
reviews  of  certain  aspects  of  internationalism 
and  a profound  study  of  law  and  courts  which 
will  give  the  book  permanent  value. 

The  discussion  centered  largely  upon  the 
proposed  international  court  of  justice,  an  idea 
which  has  been  the  hope  of  leading  thinkers 
of  the  world  for  many  generations  and  which 

18 


it  is  confidently  believed  we  are  on  the  eve  of 
realizing. 

The  discussions  were  participated  in  by 
such  statesmen,  educators  and  men  of  affairs 
as; 


President  Taft 
Hon.  Simeon  E.  Baldwin 
Hon.  Richard  Bartholdt 
Justice  Henry  B.  Brown 
Andrew  Carnegie 
Hon.  Joseph  H.  Choate 
Hon.  Wm.  Bourke  Cockran 
Chas.  W.  Eliot 
Hon.  John  W.  Foster 
Hon.  Wm.  Dudley  Foulke 
The  French  Ambassador 
James  Cardinal  Gibbons 
Edwin  Ginn 

Major-General  Frederick  D. 

Grant,  U.  S.  A. 

Chas.  Noble  Gregory 
Francis  W.  Hirst 
David  Starr  Jordan 
Frederick  N.  Judson 
Harry  Pratt  Judson 
Hon.  Martin  W.  Littleton 


Hon.  Francis  B.  Loomis 
Hon.  Henry  B.  F.  Macfarland 
Frederic  D.  McKenney 
The  Mexican  Ambassador 
Hon.  Andrew  J.  Montague 
The  Minister  of  the  Nether- 
lands 

Thomas  Nelson  Page 
Jackson  H.  Ralston 
Justice  William  Renwick  Rid- 
dell 

Hon.  Elihu  Root 
James  Brown  Scott 
Alpheus  H.  Snow 
Rear-Admiral  Chas.  H.  Stock- 
ton 

Hon.  Oscar  S.  Straus 
Eugene  Wambaugh 
Benjamin  Ide  Wheeler 
General  Stewart  L.  Woodford 


They  suggest  in  a comprehensive  way  the 
immeasurable  direct  advantages  which  would 
accrue  from  the  establishment  of  a court,  to- 
gether with  certain  collateral  results  such  as 
the  upbuilding  of  international  law.  Such 
growth  of  law  would  follow  as  a result  of  the 
decisions  of  the  court  and  as  a result  further 


19 


of  the  codification  of  certain  spheres  of  inter- 
national law  which  would  be  Invited  by  the 
very  existence  of  such  a court. 

The  volume  will  be  found  useful  as  a book 
of  reference  for  those  who  have  occasion  to 
treat  this  subject  in  an  essay  or  address  at  any 
time.  It  will  be  found  particularly  valuable 
for  students  of  international  questions. 

Price,  bound  in  paper,  $i.oo. 

WILLIAMS  & WILKINS  COMPANY, 

2427  York  Road,  Baltimore,  Md. 


Amfrfran  &orlrtg  fnr  3ubtrial  g’fttlfumxl  of 
Sntfmatumal  StE)ratfa 

Honorary  President,  William  Howard  Taft. 

President,  John  Hays  Hammond, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

Vice-President,  Simeon  E.  Baldwin, 

Hartford,  Conn. 

Secretary,  Theodore  Marburg, 

Baltimore,  Md. 

Treasurer,  J.  G.  Schmidlapp, 

Cincinnati,  Ohio. 

Life  membership,  $ioo;  Sustaining  membership,  $io  a year; 
Annual  membership,  fi  a year. 

Remit  to  treasurer,  J.  G.  Schmidlapp,  Cincinnati,  U.S.A.  Address 
inquiries  to  secretary,  Theodore  Marburg,  Baltimore,  U.  S.  A. 

The  proceedings  of  the  “Judicial  Settlement”  Conference  at 
Washington,  December  15-17,  igio,  will  be  printed  in  English, 
French,  German  and  Spanish,  ^ch  member  of  the  Society  will 
be  entitled  to  one  copy.  Non-members  may  procure  them  for 
One  Dollar  a copy. 

Additional  copies  of  this  or  other  issues  of  the  Judicial  Settle- 
ment Quarterly  may  be  obtained  without  charge  from  the  As- 
sistant Secretary, 

TUNSTALL  SMITH, 

The  Preston,  Baltimore,  U.  S.  .A. 


21 


Atnrriran  ^urtrlQ  for  ^nDirial  @rttlrtnrat  of 
Sntrmational  13iB|mtrB 

Abttfsorg  (Samuil 
Lyuan  Abbott,  New  York. 

Edwin  A.  Alderman,  Virginia. 

James  B.  Angell,  Michigan. 

Simeon  E.  Baldwin,  Connecticut. 

Rickard  Bartholdt,  Missouri. 

Alexander  Graham  Bell,  Washington,  D.  C. 

R.  L.  Borden,  Ottawa,  Ont. 

Theodore  E.  Burton,  Ohio. 

JoAguiN  D.  Casasus,  Mexico  City,  Mexico. 

George  E.  Chamberlain,  Oregon. 

Winston  Churchill,  New  Hampshire. 

George  B.  Cutten,  Wolfville,  N.  S. 

William  R.  Day,  Ohio. 

Jacob  M.  Dickinson,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Andrew  S.  Draper,  New  York. 

Charles  W.  Eliot,  Massachusetts. 

Charles  E.  Fenner,  Louisiana. 

William  Dudley  Foulke,  Indiana. 

James  Cardinal  Gibbons,  Maryland. 

George  Gray,  Delaware. 

Charles  Noble  Gregory,  Iowa. 

Peter  S.  Grosscup,  Illinois. 

Joseph  F.  Johnston,  Alabama. 

David  Starr  Jordan,  California. 

Harry  Pratt  Judson,  Illinois. 

William  H.  King,  Utah. 

George  W.  Kirchwey,  New  York. 

Philander  C.  Knox,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Charles  F.  Libby,  Maine. 

Francis  B.  Loomis,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Horace  H.  Lurton,  Tennessee. 

R.  McBride,  Victoria,  B.  C. 

Pablo  Macedo,  Mexico  City,  Mexico. 

Charles  Marcil,  Ottawa,  Ont. 


22 


Publications  of  the  American  Society  for  Judicial 
Settlement  of  International  Disputes — 

1.  The  New  Era  of  International  Courts,  by 
Simeon  E.  Baldwin.  August,  1910. 

2.  The  Necessity  of  a Permanent  Tribunal,  by 
Ernest  Nys.  November,  1910. 

Supplement — The  American  Society  for  Judicial 
Settlement  of  International  Disputes,  by  James 
Brown  Scott.  November,  1910. 

3.  The  Importance  of  Judicial  Settlement,  by  Elihu 
Root.  February,  1911. 

4.  The  Development  of  the  American  Doctrine  of 
Jurisdiction  of  Courts  Over  States,  by  Alpheus  H. 
Snow.  May,  1911. 

5.  An  International  Court  of  Justice  the  Next 
Step,  by  George  Grafton  Wilson. 

Salient  Thoughts,  by  Theodore  Marburg.  August, 
1911. 

6.  The  work  of  the  Hague  Court,  by  N.  Politis. 
November,  1911. 


It  is  planned  to  hold  this  year’s  Judicial  Settlement 
Conference  at  Cinncinnati  November  Seventh  and  Eighth. 
President  William  Howard  Taft  and  representative  men 
I various  parts  of  the  country  have  consented  to  be 
ent  and  to  make  addresses.  Members  of  the  society 
others  interested  in  the  cause  are  cordially  invited  to 


ANNOUNCEMENT. 


3 V/ 


) 


Sidney  E.  Mezes,  Texas. 

S.  C.  Mitchell,  South  Carolina. 

Don  Romulo  S.  Na6n,  Argentine  Republic. 
Francis  G.  Newlands,  Nevada. 

L.  Oppenheim,  Cambridge,  England. 

Thomas  Nelson  Page,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Walter  H.  Page,  New  York. 

W.  Peterson,  Montreal. 

Sir  Thomas  Raleigh,  London,  England. 
Whitelaw  Reid,  London,  England. 

William  Renwick  Riddell,  Toronto,  Ont. 

Uriah  M.  Rose,  Arkansas. 

A.  C.  Rutherford,  Edmonton,  Alberta. 

Walter  Scott,  Regina,  Saskatchewan. 

Albert  Shaw,  New  York. 

Hoke  Smith,  Georgia. 

Bishop  Robert  Strange,  North  Carolina. 

Sir  Charles  Hibbert  Tupper,  Vancouver,  B.  C. 
George  Turner,  Washington. 

Charles  R.  Van  Hise,  Wisconsin. 

Benjamin  Ide  Wheeler,  California. 

William  Allen  White,  Kansas. 

George  G.  Wilson,  Rhode  Island. 

Prince  de  Cassano,  Italy. 


Publications  of  the  American  Society  for  Judicial 
Settlement  of  International  Disputes — 

1.  The  New  Era  of  International  Courts,  by 
Simeon  E.  Baldwin.  August,  1910. 

2.  The  Necessity  of  a Permanent  Tribunal,  by 
Ernest  Nys.  November,  1910. 

Supplement — The  American  Society  for  Judicial 
Settlement  of  International  Disputes,  by  James 
Brown  Scott.  November,  1910. 

3.  The  Importance  of  Judicial  Settlement,  by  Elihu 
Root.  February,  1911. 

4.  The  Development  of  the  American  Doctrine  of 
Jurisdiction  of  Courts  Over  States,  by  Alpheus  H. 
Snow.  May,  1911. 

5.  An  International  Court  of  Justice  the  Next 
Step,  by  George  Grafton  Wilson. 

Salient  Thoughts,  by  Theodore  Marburg.  August, 
1911. 


niiWa  iiniversitv  Libraries 


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